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Comments
Random Police-Citizen Encounters: When is a
Seizure a Seizure?
INTRODUCTION
Many airport vice details throughout the United States utilize
Walk and Talk drug interdiction programs ("Walk and Talk
Programs") in order to approach and arrest airport travelers
suspected of drug trafficking.' These Walk and Talk Programs
do not employ any type of drug courier profile and do not require
the officers to have a reasonable suspicion that a person is en-
gaged in criminal activity.2 Instead, the officers randomly ap-
proach individuals and ask them potentially incriminating ques-
tions about their travel plans and the contents of their luggage.
The program is designed to elicit incriminating responses which
ultimately may provide the officer with sufficient grounds to
detain the passenger further. The narcotics officers are trained
to engage in consensual encounters whereby airline travelers are
approached within the terminal and, in a conversational man-
ner, requested to consent to a search of their luggage or person.3
Although this police conduct may seem routine and, perhaps
commendable in light of the "War on Drugs," the Walk and Talk
Programs undermine the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. This comment suggests that the Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable seizures includes the
right to avoid face-to-face confrontations with police, except
1. See State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358 (Haw.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1849
(1992).




when the intrusion is supported by sufficient justification.4
More importantly, this comment suggests that a free society can-
not allow police to randomly encounter citizens without any
objective basis for suspecting them of wrongdoing and then justi-
fy the intrusion by claiming that the citizen consented to the
encounter.
BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right of individuals to be protected from unlawful
governmental searches and seizures.' The Fourth Amendment
applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that
involve only a brief detention short of a traditional arrest.'
Thus, whenever a police officer stops a person and prevents
them from walking away, the police officer has seized that per-
son and the Fourth Amendment mandates that the seizure be
reasonable.7 In general, the Supreme Court has consistently
held that to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the
seizure must be based on probable cause.' However, pursuant to
the Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio, a police officer may
stop and briefly detain an individual even in the absence of
probable cause if the investigating officer can point to specific
and articulable facts which would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that criminal activity is afoot.' Accordingly, reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure of
the individual, without probable cause, in order to conduct a
4. All governmental intrusions into areas protected by the Fourth Amendment
must be supported by proper justification. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). An officer may lawfully stop and question a person but he may not, without
a warrant, restrain that person from walking away unless he has probable cause to
arrest or he observes unusual or suspicious conduct from which he could reasonably
conclude that criminal activity is afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONS'r amend. IV.
6. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
7. Id. The Court explained that "whenever a police officer accosts an individ-
ual and restrains his freedom to walk away,* a seizure has occurred. Id.
8. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981).
9. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The Court in Terry held that a brief seizure or in-
vestigative encounter on less than probable cause could be "reasonable* if the limited
intrusion was based on unusual conduct which, in light of the officer's experience,




In analyzing police-citizen encounters, careful attention must
be used in classifying the factual matrix giving rise to the en-
counter. Not every encounter between a citizen and the police is
so intrusive as to trigger the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court addressed this general premise
in Florida v. Bostick10 and reiterated the familiar rule that the
Fourth Amendment permitted police officers to approach individ-
uals at random in airport lobbies and other public places and
question them, so long as a reasonable person would understand
that he or she could refuse to cooperate." This reasonable per-
son test was first announced in United States v. Mendenhall2
and has provided the theoretical framework used in analyzing
police-citizen encounters for over a decade. 3 In Mendenhall,
Justice Stewart opined that unless the police-citizen encounter
escalated into a coercive or restraining situation, the entire
episode was categorized as a mere encounter and fell outside the
ambit of the Fourth Amendment. 4
Therefore, under the Mendenhall /Royer standard, a citizen is
seized only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave."s If a reasonable person in the citizen's posi-
tion would feel free to disengage the confrontation, then there
has been no seizure and the Fourth Amendment is not trig-
gered. ' However, if the intrusiveness of the encounter is ele-
10. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
11. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.
12. 446 U.S. 544 (1980)
13. The seminal opinion of Justice Stewart was later adopted by a plurality of
the Court in Florida v. Royer. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983). The
test that has evolved is known as the Mendenhall/Royer test.
14. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court elaborat-
ed on the difference between a mere encounter and a seizure of the person which
implicated the protections of the Fourth Amendment:
We adhere to the view that a person is seized only when, by means of physi-
cal force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. Only
when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking
constitutional safeguards .... As long as the person to whom questions are
put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no
intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitu-
tion require some particularized and objective justification.
Id. at 553-54.
15. Id. The Court noted that examples of circumstances that might indicate a
seizure "would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weap-
on, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officers request might be com-
pelled." Id.
16. Id. The Court in Bostick stated that the Mendenhall/Royer "free to leave"
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vated to such a degree that a reasonable person would not feel
free to leave, then a seizure has occurred and must be justified
by either reasonable suspicion or, if the seizure rises to an ar-
rest, probable cause.1"
The constitutionality of a police-citizen encounter therefore
involves the following methodology. First, the officer must have
used physical force or the individual must have submitted to an
assertion of authority.18 Additionally, the officer, by means of
physical force or a show of authority, must'have restrained the
liberty of the individual to such a degree that a reasonable per-
son would not have believed he was free to leave."9 If either of
these two elements is absent, the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated and a seizure has not occurred.' Accordingly, if a
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, then a sei-
test embodied a principle that focused on Whether "a reasonable person would feel
free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Bostick,
501 U.S. at 436. The critical inquiry was therefore whether the police conduct would
have communicated to a reasonable person that he was at liberty to ignore the
police presence and go about his business. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 576 (1988).
17. Royer, 460 U.S. at 503. However, in California v. Hodari D, the Court re-
treated from the Mendenhall/Royer "free to leave" test and held that to have a
completed seizure, the suspect must also have submitted to the policeman's author-
ity. See California v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. 621 (1991). This formulation reduces the
Mendenhall/Royer test to merely a necessary prerequisite; the suspect must ulti-
mately yield to the show of authority in order to have a Fourth Amendment seizure.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carroll, 628 A.2d 398, 400 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), alloca-
tur granted, 644 A-2d 732 (Pa. 1994). Courts applying Hodari D have concluded that
a seizure ultimately depends upon the individual's reaction to the show of authority
by the police. See Carroll, 628 A.2d at 410. If the individual does not yield to the
show of authority, no seizure has occurred. id.
The Hodari D standard marks a radical departure from the original princi-
ples outlined in Terry. Commentators have criticized the standard because, under
Hodari D, the timing of a seizure is governed by the citizen's reaction, rather than
by the officer's conduct. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE
ON THE FoURTH AMENDMENT § 9.2 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992). Therefore, what
would otherwise be a groundless, and thus illegal Terry seizure, becomes conduct
totally outside of the Fourth Amendment merely because of the individual's
nonsubmission. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harper, 611 A.2d 1211, 1216 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992). This bizarre result will often arise when the police pursue a fleeing sus-
pect.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not ruled on the applicability of
Hodari D under the Pennsylvania Constitution. In general, the Pennsylvania appel-
late courts have decided seizure cases in conformity with United States Supreme
Court precedent. See In re Jermaine, 582 A.2d 1058, 1061 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990),
allocatur denied, 607 A.2d 253 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 549 A.2d 1323,
1331 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), allocatur denied, 562 A.2d 824 (Pa. 1989).
18. Hodari D, 499 U.S. at 626.
19. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215
(1984).
20. See Hodari D, 499 U.S. at 628.
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zure has occurred and must be supported by antecedent justifi-
cation in the form of a reasonable suspicion as mandated by
Terry. If the seizure was effectuated without antecedent justifi-
cation, then the seizure is unlawful and all evidence obtained
during the seizure must be suppressed as fruit from a poisonous
tree.21
The application of the Mendenhall/Royer test has unfortu-
nately created a vast category of police-citizen encounters which
fall outside the parameters of the Fourth Amendment.' In re-
ality, most citizens do not feel free to end an encounter with
police when randomly approached in an airport terminal or
similar public venues.' Despite the obvious restraint on liber-
ty, these police-citizen encounters fall outside the Fourth
Amendment and are regrettably characterized as mere encoun-
ters or nonseizures because, in the Supreme Court's view, a
reasonable person would feel free to end the encounter and walk
away.2' As long as the police officer is polite, non-accusatory
and calm, a court applying Mendenhall/Royer will readily find
that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or disen-
gage the encounter.' Accordingly, no seizure has occurred and
the police have not triggered the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. More importantly, police using such consensual
tactics do not need justification for the initial questioning and
can approach and interrogate anyone as long as they do not
cross the magical threshold.
The troubling constitutional problem with airport Walk and
Talk Programs now becomes apparent. When the police-citizen
encounter is initiated by the narcotics officer, the detention is
often secured without any reasonable suspicion that criminal
21. Royer, 469 U.S. at 507-08.
22. See George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Sei-
zure Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 849, 869 (1985).
23. See United States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1029 (1984) ("[Ale a factual psychological matter people who are
stopped for questioning of this kind . . . generally do not feel free to leave.").
24. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215 (explaining that an initially consensual police-citi-
zen encounter can be transformed into a seizure only if a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave).
25. See United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
928 (1988) (a police officer's non-threatening conversation with a suspect in a train'
station did not rise to an investigative detention prior to the suspect giving consent
to a canine sniff); In re Jermaine, 582 A.2d 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), allocatur de-
nied, 607 A.2d 253 (Pa. 1992) (police questioning did not amount to a seizure de-
spite the obvious restraint on a juvenile's freedom of movement); Commonwealth v.
Lidge, 582 A.2d 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), allocatur denied, 589 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1991)
(no seizure even though undercover officers sat on each side of the defendant and
repeatedly asked questions about her travel plans and luggage).
1995
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activity is afoot. Rather, the entire investigative encounter is
premised upon the officer's subjective belief that the citizen
looks like he might be carrying narcotics.' In order to alleviate
his suspicions, the officer will approach the targeted citizen and
engage in consensual conversation. The police may initiate such
encounters as long as the questioning does not implicate Men-
denhall/Royer.27 Despite the initial cordial nature of the en-
counter, the sole purpose of the questioning is to obtain permis-
sion to search the citizen's luggage or to elicit incriminating
responses.' Paradoxically, the intrusive questioning lies out-
side the parameters of the Fourth Amendment.
The consensual encounters remain sufficiently non-coercive
and outside the scope of Mendenhall IRoyer as long as the citi-
zen cooperates with the police. However, if the citizen refuses to
cooperate or wishes to disregard the questioning, he has the
constitutional right to do so and the police must disengage the
encounter unless the detention can be justified by reasonable
suspicion.' Herein lies the problem. If the citizen refuses to
reply or walks away, the authorities will deem such refusal to
cooperate as justification for a prolonged detention. Conversely,
if the citizen answers the initial, generalized questions and no
suspicion or criminality is exposed, the officer will often escalate
the encounter by asking the individual if he would consent to a
luggage or body search. In either scenario, the intrusion is esca-
lated without justification.
More importantly, in both situations, the citizen is unlikely to
feel that he is free to leave given the suddenly accusatory envi-
ronment. In reality, the citizen's liberty has been restrained and
his freedom of movement curtailed. The courts will assert that
no seizure has occurred and the police conduct remains outside
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. By categorizing the encoun-
ter as consensual, the police questioning will not implicate the
MendenhalllRoyer reasonable person test and can continue or
26. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 636 A.2d 619, 624 (Pa. 1994) (the police
officer's suspicion was not aroused by a personal observation of criminal activity but
rather by reliance on an over-inclusive drug courier profile which often included
innocent behavior).
27. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (holding that no seizure occurred unless the
circumstances of the encounter were so intimidating as to demonstrate that a rea-
sonable person would have believed he was not free to leave).
28. See Peter S. Greenberg, Drug Courier Profile, Mendenhall and Reid: Ana-
lyzing Police Intrusions on Less than Probable Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49, 75
(1981) (noting that in airport narcotic cases "a limited stop based on less than
probable cause is of little investigative value without extensive subsequent intru-
sions").
29. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 217.
Vol. 33:283
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even escalate without justification. The practical effect of such
tactics is the deterioration of the Fourth Amendment and the
privacy interest it seeks to protect.
THE PARAMETERS OF THE PROBLEM
In Pennsylvania, the superior court has confronted the consti-
tutionality of airport Walk and Talk Programs with irregularity.
The decisions in these cases are inconsistent and fail to offer
clear, articulable constitutional guidelines which would elimi-
nate the confusion over truly consensual encounters. This confu-
sion is based, in part, upon the court's heavy reliance on the
Mendenhall/Royer test. Under the Mendenhall/Royer test, the
determination as to whether a seizure has occurred is based on
an artificial legal standard, as opposed to a realistic appraisal of
the individual's actual freedom of movement.' Moreover, the
test fails to acknowledge that even a temporary detention for
questioning results in a significant restraint on that citizen's
liberty. The test, as applied in Pennsylvania, has left a broad
category of investigative police-citizen contacts outside the pa-
rameters of the Fourth Amendment, and has encouraged police
to randomly stop and detain citizens without prior justification.
Thus, it is incumbent upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
adopt a brightline test which would clearly define permissible
police conduct and guarantee the citizens of this Commonwealth
freedom from unreasonable seizures.
Within the last two years, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
has addressed the constitutionality of random police-citizen
encounters three times. The troubling characteristic of this trilo-
gy of cases is the inconsistent interpretation of when constitu-
tional rights attach and the protections afforded by such rights.
Such inconsistency in the application of constitutional rights
cannot be tolerated and reduces the constitutional safeguards of
every citizen in this Commonwealth.
An example of the court's difficulty with Mendenhall /Royer is
Commonwealth v. Stubblefield.31 In Stubblefield, agents of the
Bureau of Narcotics Investigation and Allegheny County were
monitoring passengers at the Pittsburgh International Airport
as part of a drug interdiction team.32 In the course of their in-
30. See Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in De-
termining when Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
437, 440 (1988).
31. 605 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), allocatur denied, 621 A.2d 580 (Pa.
1993).




vestigation, they began to monitor passengers disembarking
from a flight that had just arrived from Philadelphia.' One of
the agents became curious when he observed a black male and a
black female exit the runaway engaging in strange behavior,
and subsequently heard the black male call out to the black
female." According to the agent, the defendant, the black fe-
male, did not verbally respond, but continued to trail the black
male by several yards.36
Believing this behavior to be an indication of criminal activity,
the agent relayed this information to other drug interdiction
agents who agreed to follow the suspects.' After a brief obser-
vation, the agents confronted the defendant, identified them-
selves and began to interrogate her about her travel plans. 7
The defendant readily agreed to talk with the agents but contin-
ued to walk slowly on as the conversation proceeded.' Eventu-
ally the agents asked the defendant to produce some form of
identification and she complied. 9 Immediately thereafter the
agents requested that the defendant consent to a search but she
refused." Instead of terminating the encounter, the agents con-
tinued to interrogate the defendant as she walked through the
airport, and even refused to permit her to use the bathroom in
privacy.4 1 Eventually, the defendant submitted to the coercion
and handed the agents a package which was later determined to
contain a kilogram of cocaine.4
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the
initial confrontation with the agents began as a mere encounter
and evolved into an investigative detention based upon the





37. Stubblefield, 605 A.2d at 800.
38. Id. at 800-01.
39. Id. at 801.
40. Id. Stubblefield was never told that she could disengage the encounter and
walk away. Id. She also was never informed that she could refuse to consent to the
search. Id.
41. Id.
42. Stubblefield, 605 A.2d at 801.
43. Id. In Pennsylvania, the term mere encounter refers to certain non-coercive
interactions with the police that do not rise to the level of a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Douglass, 539 A.2d 412, 417-18 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1986), allocatur denied, 552 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1988). An example of such an
encounter occurs when the police simply approach a person in a public place and
ask the person brief questions. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 380 A.2d 1238, 1241 (Pa.
1977). An investigative detention, on the other hand, occurs when a police officer
Vol. 33:283
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noted that during the initial encounter between the agent and
the defendant the police were not required to have a reasonable
suspicion that she had committed a crime in order to question
her." However, the court failed to properly analyze the police
conduct after the defendant declined to participate in a consen-
sual search and when she clearly expressed an intent to disen-
gage the encounter.
Once a citizen withdraws his or her consent to further ques-
tioning by the police, the reasonableness of any subsequent
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security is gauged
by the Fourth Amendment.' The court in Stubblefield failed to
accurately identify when the defendant was seized by the police.
The defendant was seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when she first refused to consent to a search, and
expressed a desire to disengage the encounter. Instead of termi-
nating the encounter, the police continued to follow the defen-
dant and question her as she walked through the airport.'
Whenever she attempted to leave, the officers simply continued
to accompany her. 7 This conduct would surely communicate to
a reasonable person that she was not free to leave. However, be-
cause the court focused on the non-threatening nature of the
police conduct, no seizure was found despite an obvious restraint
on the defendant's ability to simply walk away." Moreover, the
continued questioning after the defendant expressed a desire to
disengage the encounter represented an escalation in the intru-
siveness of the initial encounter. At this juncture, the agents did
not possess specific and articulable facts sufficient to support a
suspicion of criminal activity. Absent such justification, the
entire intrusion was therefore unlawful and the evidence ob-
tained during the encounter should have been suppressed.49
temporarily detains an individual by means of physical force or a show of authority.
See Commonwealth v. Williams, 429 A.2d 698, 700 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). Therefore,
an investigative detention is the functional equivalent of a Terry stop and requires
reasonable suspicion in order to justify the intrusion. See Commonwealth v. Lidge,
582 A.2d 383, 386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), allocatur denied 589 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1991).
Thus, Pennsylvania courts have incorporated federal constitutional law on this issue.
44. Stubblefield, 605 A.2d at 802. The court indicated that Florida v. Royer
controlled this issue. Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)). In Royer, the
United States Supreme Court held that police "do not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment by merely approaching an individual . . . in a public place, by asking him if
he is willing to answer some questions (and] by putting questions to him if the
person is willing to listen." Royer, 460 U.S. at 497.
45. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
46. St,,bblefield, 605 A.2d at 801.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 802.
49. The exclusionary rule mandates that a court must suppress any evidence
1995
Duquesne Law Review
The frightening proposition apparent in Stubblefield is that
the police may legitimize an unlawful encounter by construing
the subject's non-cooperation as suspicious, and then claim the
requisite reasonable suspicion needed to justify the further gov-
ernmental intrusion. This absurd result is the consequence of
the Supreme Court's characterization of the initial contact as a
nonseizure and thus outside the Fourth Amendment. Because
the initial questioning requires no objective justification, the
police can remain engaged with the citizen as long as the en-
counter does not become threatening or accusatory.' However,
as the questioning continues, the police gather evidence which is
used to justify a prolonged detention or an eventual arrest."1 By
removing the initial stages of such encounters from judicial
scrutiny, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is removed
and the police are granted wide discretion to interrogate and
apprehend unwary citizens."' The critical fallacy in Stubblefield
was the court's failure to identify the point of seizure, and ana-
lyze the constitutionality of the police conduct after the defen-
dant expressed a desire to terminate the encounter.
A similar factual matrix was presented in Commonwealth v.
Jackson.' However, in Jackson the superior court correctly
held that absent reasonable suspicion, the police could not ele-
vate a mere encounter to a consensual investigative detention. '
In Jackson, the airport drug interdiction team was monitoring
passengers at Pittsburgh International Airport." After receiv-
ing information that the defendant had purchased his ticket at
the airport, had paid for it in cash and was scheduled to return
to Pittsburgh three hours later, the agents decided to stake out
the defendant's return flight.5'
After his flight returned to Pittsburgh, the defendant immedi-
ately went into the men's room.57 While in the men's room, one
of the agents observed the defendant's handbag on the floor and
obtained as fruit of an illegal seizure. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Com-
monwealth v. Bosurgi, 190 A.2d 304, 309 (Pa.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 910 (1963).
50. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
51. See Quino, 840 P.2d at 363 (by utilizing questions that gradually become
more intrusive, the officers will attempt to "bootstrap" their investigation by uncov-
ering or discovering possible criminal activity).
52. See Mitchell M. Gaswirth, Comment, Reformulating Seizures - Airport
Drug Stops and the Fourth Amendment, 69 CAl, L. REV. 1486, 1496 (1981).
53. 630 A.2d 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), allocatur denied, 644 A.2d 733 (Pa.
1994).
54. Jackson, 630 A.2d at 1235.




heard the sound of a zipper and a flush of the toilet.' When
the defendant exited the restroom, the agents immediately be-
gan walking along side of him and began to ask him ques-
tions."9 The defendant agreed to answer the brief questions,
and when asked, provided the agents with his airplane ticket
and identification." At the agent's request, the defendant
stepped out of the flow of traffic and was asked to consent to a
pat down search."' Somewhat bewildered, the defendant agreed
and the pat down search ultimately revealed a package of co-
caine.6"
On appeal, the superior court concluded that when the agents
maneuvered the defendant out of the flow of traffic they had
elevated the mere encounter into a more intrusive investigative
encounter." More importantly, the court asserted that no rea-
sonable suspicion existed to justify a more intrusive encoun-
ter." Because the consent was offered at a point where no justi-
fication existed to elevate the intrusion, the consent was inval-
id.65
Although the constitutional questions in Stubblefield and
Jackson are not identical, both cases illustrate the need for a
new set of guidelines when analyzing consensual encounters.
Although brief warnings were given in Jackson, they were am-
biguous and were only given after the entire episode had esca-
lated into an investigative detention. The critical issue remains
whether the encounter can be characterized as consensual when
in fact the individual was never given the opportunity to disen-
gage. Moreover, the heavy reliance on MendenhalllRoyer fails to
offer a consistent standard from which to gauge such encoun-
ters. In Terry the court noted that a seizure occurs when an
officer has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.' The
threshold for restraint is governed by Mendenhall.67 If restraint
58. Id.
59. Jackson, 630 A.2d at 1232.
60. Id.
61. Id. The officers casually informed Jackson that he did not have to agree to
the pat down search. Id. This warning was given only after the encounter had esca-
lated into a more intrusive stop.
62. Id. at 1232-33.
63. Id. at 1235.
64. Jackson, 630 A.2d at 1235.
65. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Daniels, 599 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991),
allocatur denied, 612 A.2d 983 (Pa. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1361 (1993) (hold-
ing that consent given after the encounter had escalated without justification, was
not voluntary, and therefore was invalid).
66. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
67. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
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is the factual predicate, Stubblefield cannot be reconciled with
Jackson. The Mendenhall/Royer test fails to offer sound analyti-
cal justification for finding a seizure in Jackson but not in
Stubblefield.
Merely asking the citizen whether he minds consenting to a
luggage search does not eliminate the need for antecedent justi-
fication in the form of a reasonable suspicion." Such a request
would likely communicate to a reasonable person that something
was wrong and he was not free to leave. Because of the instinc-
tive pressure to cooperate with the police, most citizens will
allow the encounter to escalate and will ultimately consent to
such searches. 9 Alarmingly, all this can occur at random and
without regard to whether the police have a reasonable suspi-
cion that criminal activity is occurring. The Jackson court recog-
nized this danger and concluded that the escalation was unwar-
ranted. However, until the Mendenhall IRoyer test is fully reex-
amined, many police-citizen encounters will continue to fall
outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment and the free-
dom of movement of all citizens will remain jeopardized.
The third case in this trilogy is Commonwealth v. Harrell.7
As in Stubblefield and Jackson, the facts giving rise to the po-
lice-citizen encounter occurred at the Pittsburgh International
Airport. After disembarking from his flight, the defendant
scanned the waiting room area and then immediately proceeded
into the men's room.7' The agents monitoring the flight then
went into the bathroom to conduct further observation of the
defendant and it appeared to the agents that the defendant was
sitting on a toilet without using it.72 Upon exiting the men's
room, the defendant appeared nervous and made two telephone
calls.73 After observing the defendant for approximately twenty
minutes, the agents confronted the defendant and identified
68. See Commonwealth v. Burgos, 299 A.2d 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972). In
Burgos, the court stated that mere acquiescence in the orders, suggestions or re-
quests of a police officer can never be equated with consent. Burgos, 299 A.2d at 37.
Moreover, the court noted that a finding of voluntary consent can never rest solely
on the fact that the citizen cooperated or merely gave permission to the police to
proceed. Id. at 36.
69. See Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882, 899 (N.D. Ill.
1975), affd, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977)
(en banc) ("Implicit in the introduction of the [officer] and the initial questioning is
a show of authority to which the average person encountered will feel obliged to
stop and respond. Few will feel they can walk away or refuse to answer.").
70. No. 242 Pittsburgh 1992, slip op. (Pa. Super. Ct. October 27, 1993), reh'g
denied, 641 A.2d 1223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).





themselves as narcotic officers.74
The agents asked the defendant if he would mind talking to
them and he agreed.7 5 The agents inquired about the defend-
ant's travel plans and also requested some form of identifica-
tion. 6 The defendant complied with each and every request and
finally asked if he had done something wrong.77 The agents
said "no" and immediately asked if the defendant would consent
to a body search.78 The defendant reluctantly agreed and in a
confused, nervous manner asked if he was under arrest.7" The
agents again said "no" but then observed a crystalline type of
powder on the defendant's pant leg which they suspected to be
cocaine. 0 He was then placed under arrest."
On appeal, the underlying issue, as in Stubblefield and Jack-
son, was whether an individual could consent to an investigative
detention.82 The superior court held that the defendant was
never seized and that the entire episode was a mere encounter
which required no justification.' Remarkably, the court simply
ignored the agents' request that the defendant consent to a
search of his person. Undoubtedly, this request was made with-
out justification and clearly was an escalation which trans-
formed a mere encounter into an investigative detention.'
To justify the continued detention through the mechanism of
consent is illogical. The problem is identifying when the citizen
was seized. The superior court seemed to interpret the citizen's
cooperation with police questioning as evidence that the encoun-
ter was non-threatening and therefore was outside Menden-
hall/Royer.' However, most citizens, when confronted by po-
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id.
76. Harrell, slip op. at 4.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id. At this time, the officers informed Harrell that he was free to leave at
any time and that he could refuse to consent to a search. Id. at 6.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id. at 6.
81. Harrell, slip op. at 6.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 13.
84. The scope of any seizure "must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its application permissible." Royer, 460 U.S. at 500
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)
(Fortas, J., concurring))). "The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its
underlying justification." Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. When the initial police interception
fails to uncover sufficient evidence to justify further intrusion, the police exceed the
scope of their justification if they continue the detention and interrogation. The en-
counter thereby escalates without legal justification.
85. In Harrell, the court stated:
There was no display of a weapon or the use of physical force to remove ap-
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lice, will feel compelled to answer any and all questions and
correspondingly will not feel free to leave." Moreover, such
stops represent an immediate restraint on that citizen's freedom
of movement. By categorizing the citizen's cooperation as consen-
sual is disingenuous given the totality of the circumstances
which permeate such encounters.
In reality, the defendant was seized when he was stopped and
asked if he was willing to answer some questions. These were
not innocent questions. These questions were designed to elicit
incriminating responses and to uncover evidence which could be
used to detain the citizen further.'7 The Mendenhall /Royer test
fails to distinguish encounters of this nature from those where
the objective of the officer is merely to elicit cooperation from a
witness or a bystander." Moreover, the Mendenhall/Royer test,
as applied by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, fails to consider
the underlying purpose of the random encounter and the motive
behind the questioning. These factors should be considered when
the freedom from arbitrary governmental interference is at
stake.89
Thus, even if the confrontation between the defendant and the
agents began as a mere encounter, after the officers checked his
identification and asked routine questions, the mere encounter
ceased. The continued detention of the defendant beyond this
point escalated the encounter into a classical seizure and this
subsequent stop was not justified by articulable and objective
pellant to a detention room. The detectives did not speak to appellant in a
threatening manner but rather explained their purpose and asked "if he would
mind talking to them." Appellant responded, "Sure, no problem." The initial
contact between the police and appellant amounted to a non-coercive encoun-
ter .... The movement of appellant out of the shuttle bus line was done
solely to free up pedestrian traffic flow.
Harrell, slip op. at 10.
86. See Quino, 840 P.2d at 363 ("[T]he circumstances beget an obligation by
the citizen to reply to any and all questions, no matter how intrusive, lest the au-
thorities deem one's conduct suspicious."); see also Jermaine, 582 A.2d at 1065
(Popovich, J., dissenting) (noting that it was a myth that reasonable people when
confronted by police actually believed they had the option to refuse to cooperate and
could just walk away).
87. See Quino, 840 P.2d at 363 (noting that the questions in such drug stops
were pretextual and were specifically designed to elicit responses which would either
vindicate or implicate the suspect).
88. See Butterfoss, cited at note 31, at 473.
89. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Perhaps Justice Brennan's observation best captured the urgency of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, when he stated, "[like most of the Bill of Rights [the
Fourth Amendment] was not designed to be a shelter for criminals, but a basic
protection for everyone; to be sure, it must be upheld when asserted by criminals, in
order that it may be at all effective." Abel, 362 U.S. at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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facts as mandated by Terry and its progeny.'o The continued
detention of Mr. Harrell therefore parallels the troubling aspect
of Stubblefield - at some point a mere encounter ends and the
continued detention ripens into an investigative detention. How-
ever, as Stubblefield and Harrell indicate, this continued deten-
tion and escalation can be justified by merely claiming that the
individual's willingness to remain engaged with the police dem-
onstrates the consensual nature of the encounter. More impor-
tantly, the consensual nature of the questioning is utilized to
characterize the entire encounter as a nonseizure and outside
the parameters of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the
distinction between mere encounters and Fourth Amendment
seizures must be clarified and this can be accomplished only by
reevaluating the Mendenhall /Royer test as presently used in
this Commonwealth.
PROPOSED SEIZURE ANALYSIS
The critical mechanism of the Walk and Talk Programs, as
illustrated in Stubblefield, is the notion of voluntary cooperation
or consensual conversation with the police. As long as the en-
counter is categorized as consensual, no seizure has occurred.9'
The police must phrase each interrogation as a polite request in
order to prevent the encounter from ripening into an investiga-
tive detention. If the police questioning is civil and non-accusato-
ry, then it is likely that a reviewing court would find that a
reasonable person would feel free to leave.' Despite the clear
investigative purpose of the questioning, the encounter will not
implicate the Fourth Amendment and the police do not need
justification for the initial stop.
This comment suggests that the traditional Mendenhall/Royer
analysis is no longer faithful to the Fourth Amendment. Accord-
ingly, Pennsylvania should modify the MendenhalllRoyer test
90. Justice Ford Elliot in her concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Tindell,
addressed the illogical notion that an escalated detention could be justified by the
individual's consent:
Further, I believe it strains the imagination to say that a police request to
search one's bags, purse, or person can be part of an inoffensive and
unintrusive mere encounter. To carry forward such logic would convert a
weapons pat down, otherwise defined as a Terry stop, into a mere encounter
so long as the police are polite about it and gentle in where they place their
hands.
Commonwealth v. Tindell, 629 A.2d 161, 165 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (Ford Elliot, J.,
concurring).
91. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215.
92. See text accompanying notes 21-29.
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and structure an analysis of seizures that is consistent with the
protection of individual liberty and freedom of movement. The
proper inquiry in such encounters should focus on the purpose of
the encounter and the actual restraint on the individual." In
addition, in order to safeguard truly consensual encounters, the
police should provide warnings that advise the citizen of his or
her right to walk away when there exists no justification for the
stop.94
Consent
In this Commonwealth and in most jurisdictions throughout
the United States, the police are not required to inform the
person of his or her right to refuse to consent to a search. 9
Some jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania, have even held that
the state does not have to demonstrate that the consenter was
aware of his or her right to refuse to such a search.' This prin-
ciple was first articulated in the United States Supreme Court
decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte97 and has remained un-
challenged for nearly twenty years.
Schneckloth held that an explicit warning that an individual
had a constitutional right to refuse consent to a search was not
required to find that the person freely and voluntarily gave
consent.9" Initially, Schneckloth may appear to foreclose the
argument for warnings prior to a suspicionless encounter. How-
ever, the inflexible rule in Schneckloth and the corresponding
precedent developed in Pennsylvania are appropriate only in the
context of searches whose scope is generally well-defined and
93. See State v. Kearns, 867 P.2d 903 (Haw. 1994).
94. See Kearns, 867 P.2d at 909.
95. See Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154 (Alaska 1979); State v. Knaubert, 550
P.2d 1095 (Ariz. 1976); People v. James, 561 P.2d 1135 (Cal. 1977); People v. Helm,
633 P.2d 1071 (Colo. 1981); State v. Price, 521 P.2d 376 (Haw. 1974); Reese v.
State, 596 P.2d 212 (Nev. 1979); State v. Flores, 570 P.2d 965 (Or. 1977); State v.
Rodgers, 349 N.W.2d 453 (Wis. 1984).
96. See Commonwealth v. Markman, 467 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983);
Commonwealth v. Woods, 368 A.2d 304 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
97. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
98. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. In Schneckloth, the defendant was a passen-
ger in an automobile which had been stopped for a routine traffic violation. Id. at
220. When the' driver was unable to produce a license, the officer asked another
occupant if he could search the car. Id. The occupant granted the request and the
officer eventually found stolen checks in the trunk which were later used against the
defendant. Id. at 222. The Court held that the validity of the occupant's consent to
the search was to be determined by an evaluation under the traditional
voluntariness test. Id. at 224. Proof that the person giving consent knew he or she
had the right to refuse was simply one circumstance to be taken into account. Id.
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limited at the time consent is given." The rule is inappropriate
in the context of the Walk and Talk Programs where the seizure
is an ongoing interrogation of increasing intrusiveness whose
scope is not revealed to the individual at the outset.' °° There-
fore, it is incumbent upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
depart from the rigid rule of Schneckloth.
The individual has a constitutional right to control his or her
freedom of movement, which includes the right to ignore a police
request for information and walk away if there exists no ante-
cedent justification for the encounter.' ° If the individual ac-
cedes to the requests and consents to a more intrusive en-
counter, he or she has effectively waived this constitutional
right. A troubling question arises out of this matrix: how can a
citizen waive something as precious as a constitutional right
without being aware of its existence? To justify the intrusion as
consensual without demonstrating legitimate consent is illogical.
Unfortunately, recent Pennsylvania decisions indicate that mere
acquiescence to questioning may serve as evidence or proof of
consent. 2 However, the troubling question remains unan-
swered and calls into question the reasonableness of such deci-
sions.
In Johnson v. Zerbst, °o the United States Supreme Court
defined a constitutionally valid consent as an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."'
Thus, the capacity to consent necessarily depends upon knowl-
edge that there is a choice to be made.'" Absent such knowl-
edge, it is illogical to state that a citizen's consent was truly
voluntary. Before a court can rule that a person has waived a
constitutional right, it should be demonstrated that the citizen
had knowledge of that right and that he could make an intelli-
gent waiver.1" In the typical random police-citizen encounter,
99. See Kearns, 867 P.2d at 909.
100. Id. at 905-06.
101. See Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of
"Stop' and "Arrest,' 43 OHIO ST. L. J. 771 (1982); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33
(Harlan, J., concurring).
102. See Commonwealth v. Stubblefield, 605 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992),
allocatur denied, 621 A-2d 580 (Pa. 1993); In re Jermaine, 582 A.2d 1058 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1990), allocatur denied, 607 A.2d 253 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Lidge,
582 A.2d 384 (Pa. Super Ct. 1990), allocatur denied, 589 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1991).
103. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
104. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
105. In Commonwealth v. Walsh, the court noted that a valid consent to a war-
rantless search must be intelligent or knowing. and this required at least a "minimal
sense of awareness of what is going on vis-a-vis the consent." Commonwealth v.
Walsh, 460 A.2d 767, 772 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
106. In State v. Johnson, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that under the
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the citizen is rarely advised of his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Yet, because no reasonable
suspicion existed to justify the initial intrusion, the police will
often engage in consensual conversation in order to elicit an
incriminating response.1" If the officer is not fully convinced of
the credibility of the response, the officer will use the response
as reasonable suspicion to justify a further detention. With each
response, the citizen's constitutional right to control his freedom
of movement vanishes without knowledge or warning.
Purpose
The MendenhalliRoyer standard does not take into account
the investigatory nature of the Walk and Talk Programs. Essen-
tially, the Mendenhall /Royer test treats all street encounters
identically and without reference to the underlying purpose
behind the initial stop."~ There are encounters between police
and citizens which are not initiated for investigative purposes;
the police often question bystanders who have witnessed an acci-
dent; they may question citizens about the identity of a missing
person; or police may approach individuals who have themselves
requested police intervention.'" The critical distinction is that
a citizen's liberty is less likely to be restrained in such innocu-
ous police-citizen encounters. When the police confront citizens
with an intent to obtain incriminating evidence, however, the
encounter will immediately cause an involuntary restraint on
that citizen's freedom of movement."' Therefore, consideration
New Jersey Constitution, the validity of a consensual search must be measured in
terms of waiver. State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975). Moreover, the court
held that if a search was to be justified upon consent, the state had the burden of
demonstrating knowledge on the part of the person involved that he or she had a
choice in the matter. Johnson, 346 A.2d at 68.
107. This practice is likely to increase in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision in Commonwedith v. Lewis. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 636 A.2d
619 (Pa. 1994). In Lewis, the high court expressed dissatisfaction with the current
reliance on the drug courier profile as a device used by drug interdiction agents.
Lewis, 636 A.2d at 624. The court noted that "the use of a drug courier profile en-
courages the police officer to direct his attention to any individual whose behavior
falls within an over-inclusive set of characteristics that include innocent action." Id.
Fearful of this over-inclusive use of the profiles, the court held that the drug courier
profile should serve only as a starting point and should not substitute the need for
independent suspicion of an individual's behavior as mandated by Terry. Id. With
the decline of drug courier profiles, narcotic agents are likely to expand the use of
consensual encounters in order to investigate unwary travelers.
108. See Butterfoss, cited at note 30, at 473.
109. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 ("Encounters are initiated by the police for a
wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prose-
cute for a crime.').
110, :See Gaswirth, cited at note 52, at 1502 (an investigative detention "is
300 Vol. 33:283
Comments
of the purpose of the encounter must be an integral component
when determining if a seizure has occurred.
The Hawaii Supreme Court recently adopted an analysis that
focuses on the initial purpose of the encounter. In State v.
Kearns, the Hawaii Supreme Court made a radical departure
from the Mendenhall/Royer test and formulated a stricter stan-
dard under the Hawaii State Constitution."' The approach
taken by the Hawaii Supreme Court is the course the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania should follow when analyzing random
police-citizen encounters.
The facts in Kearns are typical of most airport encounters
with police. The defendant was approached in the Honolulu
International Airport after he aroused the suspicions of a nar-
cotics officer. 2 The defendant displayed characteristics that
were consistent with a drug courier, which prompted the officer.
to approach the defendant."' After initial questioning, the offi-
cer requested to search the defendant's luggage and later asked
to frisk him.114 The encounter later revealed that the defen-
dant was carrying contraband. 6
The Hawaii Supreme Court was alarmed by the intrusiveness
of such a random encounter. When the officer approached the
defendant, he did not possess reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was occurring." The encounter could therefore be jus-
tified only if it was characterized as consensual and outside of
Mendenhall/Royer 17 The court disagreed with the use of the
Mendenhall/Royer standard, and announced that Mendenhall
would no longer control when an individual was seized and
when reasonable suspicion was required to justify such an intru-
sion." 8 Under the Hawaii Constitution, an individual was
seized when a police officer approached the person with the
intention of conducting a criminal investigation.1 Thus, the
defendant was seized when the officer approached the defendant
more likely to necessitate exculpatory action by the citizen, and his liberty to do as
he pleases is corresponding reduced").
111. Kearns, 867 P.2d at 907.




116. Kearns, 867 P.2d at 908.
117. See text accompanying notes 21-29.
118. Kearns, 867 P.2d at 907.
119. Id. The court stated "that a person is seized, for purposes of Article I,
Section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, when a police officer approaches that person
for the express or implied purpose of investigating him or her for possible criminal
violations and begins to ask for information." Id. (emphasis added).
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and began to ask him for information'2
The standard adopted by the Hawaii Supreme Court will
preclude random encounters with travelers unless the police can
establish a reasonable suspicion that justifies the intrusion. The
Hawaii Supreme Court has thus introduced the notion of seizure
much earlier in the encounter than the Mendenhall/Royer test.
A seizure will occur whenever a police officer stops an individual
with the express or implied purpose of conducting an investiga-
tory detention. 2' At this moment, the citizen has been seized
and the seizure must be supported by antecedent justification as
mandated by Terry.
Consensual Seizures
A literal application of the Kearns test would render almost
all airport encounters as seizures. Recognizing the legitimate
law enforcement interests in apprehending narcotics dealers, the
Hawaii Supreme Court further clarified the notion of a consen-
sual encounter. In essence, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that
before an encounter could be deemed consensual, the citizen had
to be informed of his right to decline participation and walk
away."= If the citizen remains engaged after these warnings,
then the encounter could be accurately described as consensu-
al.123
The Hawaii approach reduces the broad category of police-
citizen encounters which now fall outside of judicial scrutiny by
virtue of the Mendenhall/Royer test. The Kearns test correctly
focuses upon the purpose behind the stop and the actual re-
straint on the citizen's liberty."4 Furthermore, by identifying
such encounters as seizures, the Kearns test eliminates the
myth of the reasonable person. No longer will the actual re-
straint of an individual be measured by an artificial legal
standard that is unresponsive to the uniqueness of each encoun-
ter. Instead, the inquiry will properly focus on the actual re-
straint imposed and the governmental intent for causing such
restraint.
In addition, the Kearns test recognizes that mere acquiescence
to police questioning cannot serve as evidence or proof that the
120. Id, at 907.
121. Id.
122. 1d at 909.
123. Kearns, 867 P.2d at 909.
124. See also In re Tony C., 582 P.2d 957, 961 (Cal.. 1978) (en banc) (holding
that if an individual was stopped or detained because the officer wished to investi-
gate that individual for possible criminal activity a seizure had occurred).
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citizen consented to the encounter.1" By eliminating the con-
sensual encounter, the Kearns test has introduced the consensu-
al seizure.1" Because investigative questioning of a suspect
will be characterized as a seizure and not a consensual encoun-
ter, the Kearns test has made a radical departure from United
States Supreme Court precedent.27 To prevent the justification
of unlawful, suspicionless encounters through the mechanism of
consent, the Kearns test mandates that the citizen be apprised
of his rights to disengage at the onset of the encounter." The
court observed that many seizures occur at the inception of in-
teraction between the police and the citizen, and in such situa-
tions it is simply illogical to conclude that the citizen consented
prior to the actual seizure." Therefore, the Kearns test re-
quires the officer to inform the citizen, prior to questioning, that
he or she has the right to decline participation and may walk
away."s Of course, if the police have reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is occurring, no warnings are required because
the stop is justified under Terry. The test thus strikes a balance
between individual autonomy and the legitimate aims of police
questioning.
In light of the above discussion, the utility for a test similar to
the one employed in Kearns becomes evident. Because of the en-
trenchment of Schneckloth and Mendenhall, it is unlikely that
any movement will occur under the federal constitution. Howev-
er, it is widely accepted that each state has the power to provide
broader standards and may provide constitutional protections
beyond the minimum floor which is established by the United
States Constitution."13 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
125. Kearns, 867 P.2d at 909.
126. Id.
127. The United States Supreme Court has used the term "consensual encoun-
ters" in those situations where no seizure has occurred. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.
(the encounter is consensual so long as a reasonable person would feel free to disre-
gard the police and go about his business); see also Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1,
5-6 (1984) ("[The initial contact between the officers and respondent . . . was clearly
the sort of consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest.").
128. Kearns, 867, P.2d at 909. The court explained "it is appropriate to require
police officers who wish to question individuals without even a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity to ensure that the individuals are aware of their rights." Id.
129. Id. at 908 n.5.
130. Id. at 910 (Levinson, J., concurring). Critical to the concurring opinion was
a recognition that the warning be given prior to the questioning.
131. Each state has the power to impose higher standards on searches and
seizures under state constitutional law than is required by the federal constitution.
See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); see also Commonwealth v. Sell, 470
A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983). In Sell, the court observed that the United States Constitution
establishes certain minimum levels which are applicable to the states but each state
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stated with increasing frequency that it is both important and
necessary that the court undertake an independent analysis of
the Pennsylvania Constitution each time a provision of this
document is implicated." 2  Therefore, any development or
movement pertaining to random police-citizen encounters is
likely to occur solely under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Given the inherently accusatory nature of the Walk and Talk
Program, it is unlikely that the person being questioned would
ever feel free to leave. Accordingly, the individual has been
seized despite the effort to characterize the encounter as consen-
sual and outside the parameter of Mendenhall /Royer. For such
encounters to be truly consensual, the individual questioned
should first provide voluntary and intelligent consent to the
encounter. Secondly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should
abandon Mendenhall /Royer in favor of a test similar to Kearns
for analyzing police-citizen encounters.
Utility of Warnings
Warnings that serve a dual purpose are needed. The warnings
should inform the citizen of the constitutional rights involved
and should also assist a reviewing court in determining if the
encounter was truly consensual and voluntary. Of primary im-
portance is the need to apprise the citizen of the consequences of
waiving his or her right to be free from an unreasonable sei-
zure."s A warning which would clearly articulate that the citi-
zen has the right to decline participation in the encounter and
can leave at any time would satisfy this requirement. Only with
retains the power to provide broader powers beyond the minimum floor. Sell, 470
A.2d at 467.
Similarly, Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court once explained
that, "[tihe first ten amendments [to the U.S. Constitution] establish a foundation
for the protection of human liberty. A state may not undermine that foundation, but
its constitution may build additional protections above the federal floor." Stewart G.
Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Rela-
tionship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 980 (1985).
132. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 896-97 (Pa. 1991).
The text of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides as follows:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place
or seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as
may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation sub-
scribed to by the affiant.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
133. In State v. Johnson, Justice Schreiber in his concurring opinion noted that
"consent contemplates the exercise of a choice, and choice entails the opportunity to
evaluate the available options." Johnson, 346 A.2d at 69 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
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this safeguard built into the warning can it be presumed that
the citizen made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitu-
tional right." This component also squares with the second
purpose of the warnings. If the citizen is afforded the benefit of
such warnings, his or her continued engagement with the police
will clearly be voluntary and consensual. Absent police coercion,
the warnings will effectively serve as a point of reference from
which consent can be readily ascertained. Thus, the warnings
will aid both the courts and the police in determining when a
police-citizen encounter is truly consensual and constitutional.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Should Adopt the Kearns Test
The utility of warnings will be diminished unless the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court reconsiders the application of the Menden-
hall/Royer standard. At the present time, many police-citizen
encounters can be initiated without objective justification or
suspicion." Throughout this Commonwealth, citizens are rou-
tinely approached and subtly interrogated without objective
justification for the questioning. Warnings alone will not stop
this practice; rather, the entire framework utilized in analyzing
seizures must be addressed.
The Mendenhall /Royer analysis is clearly insufficient. The
current application of the test is incompatible with the mandate
of Terry. In Terry, the Supreme Court specifically warned of the
danger of isolating the initial stages of police-citizen encounters
from constitutional safeguards." The Court feared that the
removal of judicial scrutiny would eliminate the only effective
deterrent to police misconduct." 7 The Court's solemn concern
134. In Commonwealth v. Gibson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
held that a waiver of a constitutional right can only occur where there is an "in-
tentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.' Commonwealth v. Gib-
son, 638 A.2d 203, 207 (Pa. 1994). More significantly, the court cited with approval
the pre-Schneckloth decision in United States v. Blalock. Gibson, 638 A.2d at 207
(citing United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966)). In Blalock, the
federal panel noted that the subject of a search (or seizure) must be made aware of
his or her rights against a warrantless search for a waiver to be intelligent and
truly voluntary. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. at 269. The Blalock court observed:
One cannot intelligently surrender that which he does not know he has ....
The Fourth Amendment requires no less knowing a waiver than do the Fifth
and Sixth. The requirement of knowledge in each serves the same purpose,
i.e., to prevent the possibility that the ignorant may surrender their rights
more readily than the shrewd.
Id. In light of Gibson, there appears to be movement away from the rigid rule of
Schnechioth.
135. See notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
136. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
137. Id. at 12. (The exclusionary rule "has been recognized as a principal mode
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has flourished under Mendenhall /Royer. Many of the encounters
initiated by police now fall outside the protections afforded by
the Fourth Amendment. The absence of the Fourth Amendment
protection encourages the absolutely random detention of inno-
cent citizens."
The proposal implemented by the Hawaii Supreme Court is
attractive for a number of reasons. The Kearns test correctly
curtails police authority by limiting their prerogative to stop and
question citizens unless there is objective justification for doing
so. Under Mendenhall/Royer, the police may approach anyone so
long as the encounter remains informal and non-threatening.
The Fourth Amendment is thus suspended until the encounter
reaches the point of being so intimidating or threatening that a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave."3 9 The Kearns
test eliminates this gap by treating all encounters motivated by
investigative designs as seizures.
Although the Kearns test limits police authority, it does not
diminish the ability of police to stop and question suspicious
individuals. The police may stop and question any citizen provid-
ed there is objective justification. Moreover, the police may stop
and question a citizen without objective justification provided
that the citizen consents after being apprised of his or her con-
stitutional rights. Essentially, the Kearns test provides a bright-
line rule which will assist police in gauging the constitutionality
of their conduct before they act."4 Additionally, adoption of the
Kearns test will bring much needed uniformity to judicial scruti-
ny of such encounters.
In applying the Kearns test to Stubblefield, Jackson and
Harrell, the Hawaii Supreme Court would have found a seizure
in each instance. In each encounter, the police approached the
citizen for the expressed or implied purpose of conducting a
criminal investigation. Thus, a seizure occurred at the moment
the police officer approached each defendant and began ques-
tioning. Instead of blindly applying the traditional Menden-
hal /Royer methodology, the Kearns analysis considers only two
factors. Was there objective justification for the seizure? And if
there was not, did the defendant voluntarily consent to the en-
of discouraging lawless police conduct.").
138. See United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1080 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981), vacat-
ed on reh'g on other grounds, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982).
139. See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth
Amendment On The Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1304 (1990).
140. See LAFAVE, cited at note 17, at 407 ("Any test intended to determine
what street encounters are not seizures must be expressed in terms that can be un-
derstood and applied by the officer.").
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counter after being apprised his rights? Clearly, the adoption of
a test similar to Kearns would eliminate the confusion as to
whether a seizure had actually occurred. Moreover, this test
would safeguard the precious right that is so sacred to a free
and democratic society: the freedom from unwarranted govern-
mental interference.141
CONCLUSION
The freedom from unwarranted searches and seizures is pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment and is perhaps one of the most
cherished liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights. It is a
benchmark freedom that is essential to democracy. A society
that permits its police to stop and detain travelers without justi-
fication is not a free society at all. The Fourth Amendment guar-
antees that the liberty of all citizens will not be restrained with-
out an objectively reasonable basis. This sacred covenant made
two centuries ago should not be sacrificed in the name of crime
prevention. Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
should re-evaluate the methodology currently used when analyz-
ing police-citizen encounters in order to preserve that which may
soon be lost.
Robert J. Burnett
141. See Olmetead v. United States, where Justice Brandeis exclaimed:
[The Founding Fathers] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and sensations. They conferred, as against the gov-
ernment, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifi-
able intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual . . . must
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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